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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court was clearly erroneous 
in finding that petitioner's rejection of respondent's can-
didacy for partnership was caused, in part, by discrim-
ination based on sex. 
2. Whether, given this finding, the courts below prop-
erly placed on petitioner the burden of proving that the 
same result would have been reached absent discrimina-
tion. 
(i) 
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ANN B. HOPKINS, 
Respondent 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT' 
IN OPPOSITION 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-39a) 
is reported at 825 F.2d 458. The opinion of the district 
court (Pet. App. 40a-62a) is reported at 618 F.Supp. 
1109. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 
August 4, 1987 (Pet. App. ·63a), and a petition for re-
hearing was denied on September 30, 1987 (Pet. App. 
65a). On December 11, 1987 the Chief Justice extended 
2 
the time for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari to 
January 12, 1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 ( 1). 
ST'.A TEMENT 
This case examined the elaborate and unique admis-
sions process of petitioner Price Waterhouse, a large na-
tionwide firm that in 1983 rejected respondent Ann Hop-
kins' candidacy for partnership. The partnership admis-
sions process occurs annually, stretching over a nine 
month period, and involves consideration of scores of 
candidates. Each admissions cycle includes, among other 
things, discussion and nomination of candidates by part-
ners in a local office, "long form" or "short form" writ-
ten comments by partners from other offices ( depending 
on how well they knew particular candidates), office 
visits and discussion by an Admissions Committee, and 
more discussion and final action by the Policy Board, 
Price Waterhouse's governing body. Pet. App. 5a, 41a-
42a. The admissions process is collegial in the broadest 
sense, with actors able to exert influence at myriad points 
along the path and-as the district court found-with 
special weight accorded negative views. Pet. App. 50a. 
Ann Hopkins received a glowing nomination from her 
local office, Pet. App. 4a, and was one of 88 senior man-
agers at Price Waterhouse considered for partnership 
in the 1982-83 admissions cycle. The other 87 candidates 
were men. At the time, Price Waterhouse had 662 part-
ners nationally, of whom 7 were women. Hopkins had 
secured some $40 million in new business for the firm, 
more than any other candidate. She also had more bill-
able hours than any of the men, and her clients were 
"very pleased" with her work. Pet. App. 43a. 
In early 1983 Hopkins was notified that she had not 
been selected as a partner. At that point, she discussed 
her chances for future selection with the partner-in-
charge of her office, who the district court found was "re-
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sponsible for telling her what problems the Policy Board 
had identified with her candidacy." Pet. App. 52a. He 
advised her to 
walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry. 
Id. Later, after again being passed over for partnership, 
Hopkins began the administrative process that culmi-
nated in this litigation. 
The district court treated this case as one of mixed 
lawful-unlawful motivation, noting that some partners 
raised nondiscriminatory concerns about respondent. But 
the court also expressly found that discrimination based 
on sex infected Price Waterhouse's consideration of Hop-
kins' candidacy, Pet. App. 58a-59a, and that "denial of 
partnership in her specific situation was caused, in part," 
by this discrimination. Pet. App. 62a. These findings 
were grounded on an intensive examination of the part-
nership admissions process-including but not limited to 
candidate evaluations tendered by individual partners-
and on the testimony of a social psychologist whom the 
court described as a "well qualified expert." Pet. App. 
53a. 
Having found that unlawful as well as lawful factors 
played a role in Hopkins' rejection, the district court then 
followed settled precedent and inquired whether Price 
Waterhouse had proved that Hopkins would have been 
rejected even in a bias-free setting. Mt. Healthy City 
School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); National 
Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983). The court found that 
Price Waterhouse had not carried its burden, and a 
Title VII violation was established. Pet. App. 59a-60a. 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding 
that Price Waterhouse had violated Title VII in exclud-
ing Hopkins from partnership. Describing the firm's 
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argument-similar to the one made in this Court-as 
"nothing more than a thinly disguised quarrel with the 
District Court over appropriate inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence before it," Pet. App. lla, the court 
of appeals found "ample support" for the trial court's 
finding that discrimination had "infected" the partner-
ship selection process to Hopkins' detriment. Pet. App. 
17a. This evidence consisted of the comments made about 
her, including the especially telling advice from her part-
ner-in-charge to walk, talk and dress "more femininely"; 
expert testimony that sexual stereotyping played a major 
role in Price Waterhouse's consideration of Hopkins; and 
negative comments made about previous female candi-
dates. Pet. App. 12a-17a. The court of appeals also held 
that, given the evidence of mixed motivation, the trial 
court correctly shifted the burden to Price Waterhouse 
"to show that the decision would have been the same 
absent discrimination." Pet. App. 23a. Since petitioner 
could not make this showing, the court of appeals ruled 
that the district court properly found Price Waterhouse 
liable under Title VII. Pet. App. 25a.1 
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
The decision of the court of appeals is correct, is con-
sistent with the decisions of this Court, and does not 
present a conflict with any decision of any other court of 
appeals that warrants this Court's review or that would 
make a difference in the outcome here. 
1. Introduction. This case does not warrant review 
by this Court. Decisions on partnership are covered by 
1 Hopkins had left Price Waterhouse after being passed over for 
partnership the second time, and the district court declined to award 
relief on the grounds that she had not proved constructive discharge 
and had failed to present adequate proof on damages. Pet. App. 
59a-62a. The court of appeals reversed this aspect of the trial 
court's decision and remanded for entry of "full relief." Pet. App. 
25a-28a. Price Waterhouse does not here challenge this ruling. 
I 
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Title VII, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 
( 1984) , and the courts below followed settled legal prin-
ciples in determining that Price Waterhouse denied part-
nership status to Ann Hopkins in violation of the Act. 
Price Waterhouse employs various arguments in seek-
ing to have this Court review this liability determination. 
Foremost, petitioner asserts that there was no evidence 
that discrimination played any role in the decision to 
reject Hopkins. The problem here, of course, is that the 
district court found otherwise, and that finding is not 
clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 
U.S. 564 ( 1985) . The court of appeals considered and 
rejected this factual argument, and no justification ex-
ists for further review by this Court. Rogers v. Lodg(}., 
458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982). 
Price Waterhouse also tries to suggest that it was 
error, in a mixed motivation case where unlawful moti-
vation had been established, to shift the burden to the 
employer to prove that the same decision would have 
been made absent discrimination. Yet this Court's prece-
dents require just this approach, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 
at 287, and the courts of appeals have routinely adhered 
to it in Title VII cases presenting questions of mixed 
motivation. 
Ultimately petitioner is reduced to arguing that, as-
suming the courts below were right-as they were-in 
placing the burden on Price Waterhouse to prove that 
Hopkins would have been rejected even in a neutral set-
ting, the proper evidentiary standard is preponderant 
rather than clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner 
did not press this point below, however, and for good 
reason: its resolution would make no difference in this 
case. Price Waterhouse did not begin to prove-under 
any standard-that Ann Hopkins would have been de-
nied partnership in the absence of discrimination. More-
over, even apart from this suit, there is little if any ma-
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terial distinction between the preponderant and clear 
and convincing standards as applied in Title VII cases, 
so there is no conflict warranting review by this Court. 
In any event, the clear and convincing standard is em-
ployed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commi&-
sion in similar cases, and its use here was proper. 29 
C.F.R. 1613.271. 
2. The Clearly Erroneous Standard and the Facts. 
Although ostensibly seeking review of legal issues, Price 
Waterhouse repeatedly argues the facts, suggesting that 
this was not truly a case of mixed motivation because 
there was no evidence that discrimination played any 
role in its rejection of respondent's candidacy. The dis-
trict court, however, found otherwise. The trial court's 
opinion details the evidence supporting its finding of dis-
crimination, but two points are especially instructive. 
The first is the advice Hopkins got from her boss, the 
partner-in-charge of her office, who counseled her to 
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely," etc. Pet. App. 52a. This advice had nothing 
to do with Hopkins' professional bearing or appearance 
-she was always well turned out-but it had everything 
to do with her sex. Second, the partners themselves knew 
what was going on; as the district court found, Hopkins' 
"[s] upporters indicated that her critics judged her harshly 
due to her sex." Pet. App. 51a. 
As can be seen, the district court's finding of discrimi-
nation is amply supported, and it is shielded by Rule 52. 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. at 573-74. This 
is especially true here, where the trial court was required 
to undertake detailed scrutiny of a complex and multi-
faceted partnership admissions process. 
In its petition, Price Waterhouse concentrates on try-
ing to discredit the testimony-indeed the field of exper-
tise-of Hopkins' expert. But the criticisms are the 
same ones made in the court of appeals, which properly 
r' 
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disposed of them. The court observed that the expert 
was operating within the standards of her discipline in 
concluding that sexual stereotyping played a "major de-
termining role" in petitioner's decision to reject respond-
ent's candidacy, and it noted that other evidence-includ-
ing the "extremely small number" of female partners at 
Price Waterhouse and the "positive assessments of 
Hopkins in areas where performance could be measured 
objectively"-supported that conclusion. Pet. App. 14a-
15a:2 
More important, the expert testimony was not the only 
evidence of discrimination relied on by the district court. 
Conspicuously absent from the petition is any reference 
to the advice that Hopkins' boss gave her to behave "more 
femininely." This is direct evidence of discrimination, 
which the dissent below referred to as a "smoking gun." 
Pet. App. 31a. Indeed, it is remarkable that such proof 
could be adduced in a case involving sophisticated pro-
fessionals. The dissent recognized that this evidence had 
to be addressed, although it did so only by incorrectly 
arguing that the district court was clearly erroneous in 
attaching significance to it. Id. Petitioner may be re-
luctant to make such an unvarnished assertion of clear 
error in this Court, so it simply ignores the "smoking 
gun" altogether. But it remains, and it is central to this 
case. 
The district court concluded that Price Waterhouse did 
nothing to address the "conspicuous problem" of sexual 
sterotyping in its admissions process and that, instead, 
the process gave "substantial weight" to comments in-
fluenced by such stereotypes. These factors "combined to 
~ Although petitioner here casts aspersions on the expert's com-
petence and her field, the court of appeals observed that Price 
Waterhouse "failed to challenge the validity of [the expert's] dis-
cipline at trial and disavows any such challenge here." Pet. App. 
15a. Moreover, at trial Price Waterhouse volunteered that it had 
"no objection to the expertise of this witness." 3/ 28/ 85 Tr. 540. 
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produce discrimination in the case of this plaintiff." Pet. 
App. 58a. 
In assessing these findings, the record must be "viewed 
in its entirety." Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 
at 574. From this perspective, it is plain that the dis-
trict court was not clearly erroneous in finding that dis-
crimination played a role in Price Waterhouse's rejection 
of Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partnership. The court 
of appeals carefully considered the record, and no pur-
pose would be served by having this Court again review 
these factual findings. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 623. 
3. The Law. Given its findings of fact, the legal analy-
sis employed by the district court was unexceptional. 
Even Judge Williams, dissenting in the court of appeals, 
argued the facts, not the law. Thus he had "no quarrel" 
with the principle that a "party acting with one per-
missible motive and one unlawful one may prevail only 
by affirmatively proving that it would have acted as it 
did even if the forbidden motive were absent." Pet. App. 
38a, citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, and NLRB v. 
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403. 
There could not be any quarrel with this basic principle, 
for this Court has adhered to it in many contexts involv-
ing mixed motivation. E.g., Mt. Healthy (activity im-
plicating the First Amendment) ; NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp. (unfair labor practice); Village 
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 ( 1977) (local zoning 
decision allegedly motivated in part by race). 
Indeed, contrary to Price Waterhouse's suggestion, this 
Court has made it clear that this principle applies to 
Title VII. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 
431 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 ( 1977) (" [e] ven assuming, 
arguendo, that the company's failure even to consider 
the applications was discriminatory, the company was 
entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not 
' . 
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been injured because they were not qualified and would 
not have been hired in any event," citing Mt. Healthy 
and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 ( 1977) ) . The Court has also made 
clear that Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)-upon which petitioner 
mistakenly relies-is "inapposite" to cases of mixed 
motivation, because in Burdine " [ t] he Court discussed 
only the situation in which the issue is whether illegal or 
legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' motives be-
hind the decision." NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. at 400 n.5. 
In short, this Court has provided clear guidance on the 
basic analytical approach to be used in cases of mixed 
motivation, and the circuit courts have routinely em-
ployed it where appropriate under Title VII. Fields v. 
Clark University, 817 F'.2d 931, 936 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 
295 ( 4th Cir. 1984) ; Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 
728 F.2d 614, 618 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 
(1984); r.i Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 
115 ( 6th Cir. 1987); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 
F.2d 703, 712 ( 6th Cir. 1985) ; Caviale v. Wisconsin De-
partment of Health and Social Services, 744 F.2d 1289, 
1296 (7th Cir. 1984); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Nanty v. Burrows Co., 660 
F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) ; Harbison v. Gold-
schmidt, 693 F.2d 115, 117 ( 10th Cir. 1982) ; Bell v. 
3 Petitioner erroneously claims that it is unclear whether the 
Fourth Circuit has adopted this Court's approach to mixed motiva-
tion and seeks to disparage Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50 
-which embraced this approach-by asserting that the Fourth Cir-
cuit has never since relied on Patterson. Pet. 14 n.6. This is not so. 
The Fourth Circuit expressly and prominently relied on Patterson 
in Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d at 618. 
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Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 ( 11th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). 
There is no division in the circuits warranting review 
by this Court on the question of the proper a pp roach to 
be taken in mixed motivation cases under Title VII. Mt. 
Healthy is the polestar. Price Waterhouse's attempt to 
suggest a division is misguided.4 
Ultimately petitioner retreats and recognizes that the 
legal approach taken below was consistent with this 
Court's decisions. Pet. 20 n.10. Price Waterhouse then 
quibbles whether this approach should be followed in 
Title VII cases, but as noted above this Court has already 
applied the Mt. Healthy analysis to Title VII. East 
4 Thus petitioner relies in part on decisions that are "inapposite" 
because they were traditional Burdine cases that did not involve 
findings of mixed motivation, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 764 F .2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 
(1986); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); Ross v. Communications 
Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985). Petitioner also as-
serts that there is a split in the circuits over whether "but for" 
causation is required under Title VII and implies that the Mt. 
Healthy line of authority employs some other standard of causation. 
This ignores the fact that Mt. Healthy itself provides. a vehicle for 
determining whether an unlawful motive was a "but for" cause of 
a challenged decision, as the Third Circuit recognized in a case 
relied on by petitioner, Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 
at 916 (Mt. Healthy "did not deviate from the requirement of 
'but for' causation; rather, its only effect was to allocate and 
specify burdens of proof"). This is correct and-as shown in the 
text-the circuits have followed the allocation of burdens specified 
in Mt. Healthy. Moreover, whether the burdens are said to be 
allocated in assessing liability or remedy makes no difference in 
result. Any differences on the basic Mt. Healthy approach reside 
within the circuits, not between them. Compare Davis v. Board of 
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 600 F.2d at 474, with 
Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1984); 
and Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 
744 F .2d at 1296, with McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Ass'n 
Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3462 (Dec. 11, 1987) (No. 87-999). 
f• 
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Texas Motor Fre~ght System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 
403 n.9. Finally, petitioner says that, assuming it was 
prqper for the courts below to place the burden on Price 
Waterhouse to prove that Ann Hopkins would have been 
rejected for partnership even in a nondiscriminatory set-
ting, the proper standard is preponderant rather than 
clear and convincing evidence. 
It is of course true that not all courts use the clear 
and convincing formulation to describe the employer's 
burden once discrimination has been established. E.g., 
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1325 (preponderant evi-
dence). But this is an archetypal distinction without a 
difference; its resolution is unlikely to affect any case and 
certainly would not affect the result here. For this rea-
son, Price Waterhouse failed to press this point below, 
and that alone is sufficient reason to deny the writ. 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927); 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 
(1970) ; Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 352 ( 1973) .'5 
In the court of appeals, Hopkins asserted that "Price 
Waterhouse could not make the requisite showing under 
either [the preponderant or clear and convincing] stand-
ard and has not suggested otherwise." '6 Petitioner never 
disputed this. Even in this Court Price Waterhouse does 
not contend that it proved, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Ann Hopkins would have been rejected in 
a nondiscriminatory setting. It did not even begin to 
make this showing. The partnership admissions process 
was broadly collegial; it gave special weight to negative 
views; there were any number of points along the way 
where influence could be exerted; and views were not 
always documented. As applied to Hopkins, this process 
5 The only reference to this point below came very late in a short 
footnote (n.5) in Price Waterhouse's petition for rehearing in the 
court of appeals. 
6 Reply Brief for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 27 n.11. 
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was infected by discrimination, as the courts below found. 
Given the specialized and complex nature of the admis-
sions process as well as the absence of any effort by 
Price Waterhouse to purge this infection, petitioner did 
not show that an individual of Hopkins' outstanding ob-
jective credentials-e.g., first among the candidates in 
business produced and hours billed-would still have been 
rejected even if the process had been untained by dis-
crimination. This failure of proof is as evident under 
a preponderant standard as under a clear and convincing 
test. 
Since the same result would be reached here under 
either standard, this case is a poor vehicle for addressing 
any conflict. As a practical matter, moreover, the ostensi-
ble conflict presents at most a narrow difference in ap-
proach, and there appear to be no cases in which the 
outcome would have been different had a preponderant 
rathe·r than a clear and convincing standard been applied. 
Hence addressing this issue here would at best serve lim-
ited theoretical purposes; no meaningful conflict would 
be resolved, and the decision would not affect the result 
in this case. 
Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion requires use of clear and convincing evidence in the 
area of Federal employment, where the Commission has 
direct regulatory authority. 29 C.F.R. 1613.271.7 Con-
gress intended that cases of discrimination in the Fed-
eral government and the private sector be accorded the 
same treatment, e.g., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 
840 (1976), so it was proper for the courts below to 
employ the evidentiary standard sanctioned by EEOC.13 
7 In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976), the 
Court noted the distinction between regulations and guidelines of 
EEOC and held that less weight would be accorded guidelines. The 
provision cited in the text, in contrast, is a binding regulation. 
8 This also disposes of two of petitioner's other contentions. The 
first is that guidance by this Court is needed for Federal employ-
13 
If the propriety of using the preponderant or the clear 
and convincing standard in the mixed motivation setting 
is ever to be addressed, this should occur in a case in 
which the facts precisely paint the distinction, if any, 
between the two formulations, i.e., where a difference in 
approach means a different in result. That is not true 
here. On the contrary, the size and complexity of Price 
Waterhouse's partnership admissions process make this 
case an especially poor canvas for examining this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
February 1988 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES H. HELLER 
Counsel of Record 
DOUGLAS B. HURON 
KA.TOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 393-3800 
ment. Pet. 17 n.8. But, as is shown, the Federal sector is already 
governed by clear EEOC regulations. The second contention is that 
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1) requires a different approach to cases of 
mixed motivation under Title VII than has been taken in other 
contexts. Pet. 19-20. Obviously the EEOC, the agency entrusted 
with administering the statute, does not share this view. In this 
regard, see also the discussion of East Texas Motor Freight System 
v. Rodriguez at 8-9, supra. 
